Historical Knockout Auctions

The Journal of Political Economy, one of the more prestigious economics journals, gets submissions of interesting economics related anecdotes for its back cover. The most recent issue contained this:

Collusive Bidding and Intermediary Profits in Congo a Hundred Years Ago

Five traders, who have hurried up in their cars, were waiting for the market to open. The region here has not been conceded; the market is free and the bidding began at once. We were surprised to see it stop almost immediately. But soon we understood that these five gentlemen were making a ring. The first carried off the whole crop for seven francs fifty a kilo, which probably seems a very fair price to the native, who only recently was selling his rubber at three francs; but at Kinshassa, where the traders resell it, it has fetched for some time past between thirty and forty francs, which leaves a very respectable margin. What about our gentlemen? As soon as the business is concluded with the native, they meet together privately in a little room, where another auction begins and they divide the spoil among them. The administrator is powerless against this secret auction, which, with every appearance of being illicit, does not, I am told, come within the power of the law.

[Andre Gide, Travels in the Congo (1927), translated by Dorothy Bussy (Hopewell, NJ: Ecco, 1994), p. 45. See also Daniel Graham and Robert Marshall, “Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions,” J.P.E., vol. 95, no. 6 (December 1987), 1217–39]

(Suggested by Laurent Lamy)