A Pac-Man Defense Against Predatory Pricing?

After the story of how Southwest Airlines broke an attempt at predatory pricing with booze, I learned of the Dow vs. Die Deutsche Bromkonvention episode. See here for an interesting narrative of events. To summarize, at the turn of the twentieth century, the German chemical industry was dominant and the various producers there had a comfortable cartel selling bromine at 49 cents a pound. Herbert Dow had developed a way to produce bromine and sold it in the US for 36 cents. The Germans might have been OK if he stayed in the US, but the cartel swung into action when he began exporting in 1904. 

It poured bromine into America at 15 cents a pound, well below its fixed price of 49 cents, and also below Dow’s 36 cent price.  

Dow simply pulled out of the US market and sold abroad. Moreover, he had his agents secretly buy up hundreds of thousands of pounds at that 15 cents, repackage it, and resell it in Europe at 27 cents. Instead of being driven out of business, he profited from the cartel's actions! At first the Germans were confused by the insatiable demand in the US and the lost orders from Europe. Was one of their cartel members offering secret discounts? Accusations were made. Even after they discovered Dow's ploy, they were not sure how to respond. In the end, the bromine monopoly was broken.

Perhaps Dow got lucky, but perhaps predatory pricing may not be so easy.

Use It or Lose It: The Perverse Incentives Draining the American West

If you wanted to design a property rights regime that guaranteed the waste of a scarce resource, you could hardly do better than Western water law's doctrine of prior appropriation. It requires rights holders to put water to "beneficial use" or—after five consecutive years of non-use—forfeit the right. [1] The result is a textbook perverse incentive: a farmer who irrigates more efficiently risks losing the conserved portion of her right, so the private return to conservation is negative even when the social return is big.

Oregon tried to eliminate the perverse incentive with its 1987 Instream Water Right Act that made instream flow a beneficial use. [2] On the Deschutes, conservancies now lease and buy water for the river. [3], but legalizing the trade didn't create a liquid market. Rights are mostly held by irrigation districts rather than individual farmers, so every deal needs board approval, and transaction costs run high: quantifying how much water actually reaches crops through leaky, century-old canals is expensive, and farmers still fear that proving they can conserve invites a future challenge to their right.

In the Colorado River, states face the same problem. If an Upper Basin state conserves, the saved water flows downstream to be consumed by someone else which creates the risk of becoming the baseline for future cuts. [4] Instead, the feds pay farmers billions to fallow fields—a costly government subsidy trying to address the perverse consequences of another government policy. [5]

BOTTOM LINE: any rule tying an asset's ownership to its continuous consumption—budget lines that vanish if unspent, headcount that shrinks if unfilled—will be consumed regardless of value. 

NOTES

[1] Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, "Oregon Water Law Questions and Answers" — beneficial use requirement and five-year forfeiture rule. https://www.schwabe.com/publication/oregon-water-law-questions-and-answers/

[2] Oregon Legislature, "Background Brief on Water Rights" — the 1987 legislation adding instream water rights as a beneficial use. https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/lpro/Publications/2004HM_Water_Rights.pdf

[3] University of Oregon School of Law, "Evaluating Instream Flow Programs" — Oregon's 1,100+ instream leases and transfers, including the Deschutes River Conservancy's role. https://law.uoregon.edu/sites/default/files/ai61_ch._22_with_legend1.pdf

[4] High Country News, "Why Colorado River negotiations are so difficult" — prior appropriation dynamics and the interstate stalemate. https://www.hcn.org/articles/why-colorado-river-negotiations-are-so-difficult/

[5] Congressional Research Service, "Management of the Colorado River" (R45546) — federally compensated conservation, including 2.3 million acre-feet paid for with congressionally approved drought funds. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45546

HT:  Claude Fable

A Hiccup in a Price War

Many antitrust economists are wary of the efficacy of predatory pricing, the strategy of pricing below costs to drive a competitor out of a market. The usual counter-argument is that, for it to work, the inevitable losses this will entail must be recouped after the rival has exited. Recoupment requires higher prices ... that can attract rivals again. Additionally, there are many tactics the prey can implement during the predation phase to try to thwart the predator.

A new one to me is giving away booze. As described in an article for Southwest Airlines 50th anniversary, Southwest pioneered frequent, cheap flights within Texas in the 1970s. In 1973, Braniff and Texas International started a price war offering $13 tickets. This was below Southwest's costs and was intended to drive Southwest out. Southwest countered with two-tiered prices. They would match the $13 price but also offer a $26 price that included a fifth of liquor. Most of its customers were business travelers who would expense the $26 ticket and keep the liquor. Since the liquor cost Southwest less the the the difference in the prices, it made more on the $26 tickets. Few of its customers opted for the money losing $13 tier. And, of course, the publicity of "free booze" was priceless.

Algorithmic Pricing Paper by some middling economist

Froeb, Luke M. and Tschantz, Steven T. and Sokol, D. Daniel, Algorithmic Pricing When Capacity Turns Over: Competition, Collusion, and Information Sharing (April 29, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6675958 

BOTTOM LINE: 

First, sharing occupancy information intensifies competition, as firms compete in each realized state rather than on average. Second, as occupancy rises, it becomes more difficult to absorb diverted rival demand, so firms become worse substitutes for each other, shrinking the gains to collusion. Third, scale pools demand risk, raising occupancy and lowering prices. 

 Together, these findings identify a structural channel through which algorithmic pricing in capacity-constrained markets generates efficiency gains rather than collusive overcharges. ... The results yield practical guidance on which pricing algorithm to adopt and what information to feed it.

A friend reads the Meta Opinion so I don't have to

Background:  The FTC’s case against Meta rested on a familiar monopolization narrative: Meta supposedly dominates “personal social networking” and preserved that dominance by buying Instagram and WhatsApp before they could blossom into competitive threats. For the theory to hold, users must be trapped on Meta’s platforms despite wanting something different, and Meta must be quietly degrading quality because—secure in its monopoly—it can.

After a full trial, the court found none of this matched the evidence. A friend of mine, who celebrated the opinion’s release with a glass of single malt, sent along a set of remarks that form the basis of this post.  

The European regulators required Meta to offer an ad-free Facebook and Instagram for €5.99 per month. Fewer than 0.01% of users subscribed. If consumers were truly desperate to flee the “oppressive” ad-supported model, one might have expected more than statistical noise. As my friend put it, this was not exactly the behavioral evidence one hopes for when arguing that users are crying out for an alternative.

Europe contributed another natural experiment when regulators mandated a choice screen for search engines on Android. Under the FTC’s theory, Google’s dominance stems largely from being the default—the search engine pre-selected for users who supposedly never bother to change it. So regulators removed the default entirely and required every user to make an active choice. Yet when presented with a perfectly neutral menu, over 98% still selected Google. It was a useful reminder that consumer preferences sometimes favor the incumbent for reasons unrelated to default settings.

The profits evidence fared no better. The FTC treated Meta’s high profits as proof of monopoly power, but did not rule out the more mundane explanations—efficiency, innovation, or providing products people actually like. Since Meta’s returns do not look unusual relative to other successful tech firms, the court concluded that “monopoly” was doing more work in the FTC’s theory than in the real world.

Then there was the “quality degradation” argument. The FTC suggested Meta raised its “quality-adjusted price” by making its apps worse over time. The record instead showed steady feature additions and billions in R&D investment. If Meta is secretly degrading its products, it is doing so in a very expensive and user-pleasing way.

Finally, the court noted that one FTC expert had previously urged the agency to bring this exact case. As my friend observed, this made the testimony feel less like neutral analysis and more like a very committed book report.

In the end, the court’s conclusion rested on the distance between the FTC’s theory and the evidence. The agency described a world in which consumers were effectively captive and Meta behaved like a textbook monopolist; the record pointed to something far less dramatic. Confronted with the gap, the court went with the evidence.

HT:  My friend supplied the irony. 

Are CA and NY acupuncturists evil or stupid?

CHATGPT:

Dry needling by Physical Therapists (PTs) is designed to “reset” knotted or overactive muscle tissue by causing it to spasm, bleed a little, and then relax. This usually decreases pain and improves mobility — at least temporarily — and can help jumpstart rehab when combined with other therapies.

EVIL: By preventing PT's from dry needling, acupuncturists in CA, NY, HI, OR, WA prevent residents from accessing a proven therapy: 

STUPID: From a patient's perspective, they don’t compete, so how can acupuncturists profit from eliminating a non-competitor?

• Dry needling is invasive, uncomfortable, and deliberately traumatic to the muscle — the goal is to provoke a twitch, bleeding, and ultimately a release of the knot. 
• Acupuncture is usually gentle, often painless, and oriented toward restoring balance, calming the nervous system, or addressing systemic issues. 
• So functionally, they look different to consumers — one is painful but targeted to fix a muscle problem, the other is soothing and holistic.

The zero-sum fallacy: trade, immigration

 MarginalRevolution explains much of our current political conflict as a mistaken belief in the zero-sum fallacy:

Zero sum thinking fuels support for trade protection: if other countries gain, we must be losing. It drives opposition to immigration: if immigrants benefit, natives must suffer. And it even helps explain hostility toward universities and the desire to cut science funding. For the zero-sum thinker, there’s no such thing as a public good or even a shared national interest—only “us” versus “them.” In this framework, funding top universities isn’t investing in cancer research; it’s enriching elites at everyone else’s expense. ...

Reciprocal tariffs as a tit-for-tat strategy in a repeated prisoners' dilemma

Trade policy can resemble a Prisoners' Dilemma game: free trade is the best outcome (no tariffs), but that is not a Nash Equilibrium because any country can do better by imposing tariffs on imports as it helps domestic producers.  The Nash equilibrium is for all countries to impose tariffs on imports.

One way out of this prisoners' dilemma is to play tit-for-tat (do whatever your rival did last period) because it gives foreign countries an incentive to keep their own tariffs low:  if foreign countries put a tariff on imports from the US, their exports to the US will be treated similarly.  

However, President Trump is computing reciprocal tariffs as (Trade Deficit with US)/(Exports to the US).  This measure is determined largely by foreign investment in the US, not foreign tariffs on US goods.  For example, China sells ￥to buy $ to invest in the US to buy US Treasuries.  Such an increase in demand for $ raises the price of a $ relative to the ￥.  The stronger $ makes Chinese exports look cheap to US consumers.  This is both a US Trade Deficit (the US buys more Chinese goods than China buys US goods), and a Chinese Investment Surplus (China invests more in the US than the US invests in China).

As a result of the policy, US tariffs on foreign goods are set to dramatically increase, which will likely lead to tit-for-tat responses from foreign countries which will result in less trade.  From Chapter One, we know that voluntary transactions create wealth, and with fewer of them, we are all poorer.  

It might make some sense to set reciprocal tariffs equal to actual tariffs on a country-by-country basis, i.e.,(reciprocal US tariffs on foreign goods) = (foreign tariffs on US goods). 

BOTTOM LINE: Reciprocal Tariffs, as calculated, would harm the US.  

CAVEAT:  The above analysis ignores: (i) the international nature of supply chains--domestic producers are also importers of foreign goods; and (ii) their harmful effect on consumers. 

HT:  Mike, Donna

Innovative Strategic Levers

Is narc'ing on your competition the prisoners' dilemma equilibrium?

All he wants is "good pricing"

Fron WKRN:

“There are too many liquor stores in Lebanon, just at the rate that more stores are opening. I never really felt that way before,” Andrea Ross, the owner of Cheers Wine and Liquor, said. “We know multiple liquor store owners in Lebanon [TN] that are great people, great business owners, but in order for us to continue to be able to provide good pricing and all the things that we offer, we have to be able to sustain the business.”

For anyone who has not read Chapter 6, what the incumbent liquor store owner means by "good pricing" is high pricing. To the residents of Lebanon, good pricing is low pricing. 

• By limiting competition from entrants, the city council create incentives for incumbents to support their reelection campaigns.
• Does the city council have enough information to make good decisions about the number of liquor stores, and the incentive [see above] to do so?

HT:  MH

Can President Trump break the International Corporate Tax Cartel?

 From the Economist:

The international tax system has long suffered from two related problems: firms go to great lengths to book profits in low-tax jurisdictions, and governments thus have strong incentives to compete with each other in cutting levies so as to attract investment [only a dirigiste would consider this a problem]. Hoping to forestall a [competitive] race to the bottom, 136 countries reached a [collusive] compromise in 2021 to overhaul tax rules—the outcome of talks held under the auspices of the OECD, a group of mainly rich countries. The crucial element was that governments would impose a minimum tax rate of 15% on the profits of multinational companies.

...Unlike America’s withdrawal from the World Health Organisation and the Paris climate agreement, the OECD framework is not a formal treaty that America can leave. Rather, it is a common approach that depends on governments each passing legislation to impose top-up taxes on companies that pay less than the 15% minimum. This means that, if some countries choose to tax a multinational firm at a lower rate, others can claim the difference.

In other words, if the US doesn't tax its corporations at 15%, foreign countries can claim the difference.

...Mr Trump hopes to break this logic by promising brutal retaliation. Any country that imposes a top-up tax on an American company would, in his administration’s view, be guilty of extraterritorial overreach. In executive orders issued on January 20th, the day of Mr Trump’s inauguration, it said that it could respond by doubling taxes on citizens and firms from any offending countries. These orders displayed his advisers’ talent for unearthing obscure statutes that serve their goals: the law that allows the doubling of taxes on foreigners has been in place for nine decades without being used. Even if Mr Trump’s objection to the OECD deal was expected, his threat’s ferocity surprised observers.

Coordinating on Spring Break

This year, the local school district (AISD) and community college (TCC) have shifted their Spring breaks from my university’s (UTA) second week of March to the third week of March. This has many at my university a bit upset. Childcare coverage will be problematic for my university colleagues who have small children and many planned family trips over the break will be canceled. AISD prefers to coordinate with TCC because many of the brighter high school students take dual credit courses at the community college. The childcare issue is not as important for children attending UTA or TCC because these children are a bit more independent than school-aged children. The change was instigated by TCC who prefers the 3rd week while UTA prefers the 2nd week. Should UTA follow along and change Spring break to the 3rd week?

This can be modeled as a coordination game, but it gets tricky with three players. AISD, TCC, and UTA all have two strategies, 2^nd week or 3^rd week. This makes the simultaneous game a 2x2x2 matrix. Think of this as a cube instead of a square. The payoffs below are ordered AISD, TCC, and UTA.

TCC 2^nd week

		UTA
		2nd week	3rd week
AISD	2nd week	4, 4, 2	3, 3, 1
	3rd week	3, 2, 2	3, 1, 3

 TCC 3^rd week

		UTA
		2nd week	3rd week
AISD	2nd week	2,3,2	3, 2, 3
	3rd week	3,3,2	4, 2, 4

The Nash Equilibria are all choosing the second week or all choosing the third week. For all parties, deviating would reduce their payoffs. They all prefer to coordinate but UTA and TCC prefer different coordination equilibria. For decades, they had all coordinated on the third week.

How about if TCC turned this into a sequential game? Could it force their preferred Nash Equilibrium? Below is the game in which TCC goes first, AISD follows second, and then UTA follows last. The assumed payoffs matter and I assumed that AISD benefits more from coordinating with TCC than with UTA. The red arrows represent the choices made when "looking ahead and reasoning back." With these payoffs, TCC can induce AISD to coordinate on the 3rd week. With both TCC and AISD choosing the 3rd week, it makes sense for UTA to switch to the 3rd week too.

This roughly aligns with how this all is playing out.

Advice to the New FTC Leadership

Here is the most important part (link): 

 II. Promote Innovation 

Since 2010, the U.S. economy has grown at a real rate of 1.74% per capita. At this rate, per capita income doubles every 40 years.4 When our kids turn 40, they will earn twice as much as we did.

Public policy—especially antitrust policy—should recognize that innovation drives growth, much of which comes from Big Tech and startups. Big Tech has provided consumers with more everyday value than any other small group of firms in history. And most startups “exit” via acquisition, not by going public. If the FTC prevents these exits due to concerns about lost potential competition, funding becomes harder to come by, which deters startups. The FTC should recognize these innovation incentives when setting enforcement priorities.

Here is press on the new Antitrust chief on "Taking on Big Tech and Beyond"

Slater will inherit a docket packed with blockbuster cases that aim to challenge the dominance of some of the world’s largest companies. These cases, many initiated during Trump’s first term, focus on allegations of monopolistic practices that harm consumers and stifle innovation.

Trump emphasized that Slater’s leadership will prioritize fair and vigorous enforcement of competition laws. “She will ensure that our competition laws are enforced, both vigorously and FAIRLY, with clear rules that facilitate, rather than stifle, the ingenuity of our greatest companies,” he stated.

The decision to place Slater in charge signals a continuation of the administration’s efforts to curb corporate concentration and promote competition across key sectors of the economy. With both Trump and Vance championing a tough stance on monopolistic practices, Slater’s tenure is expected to mark a pivotal chapter in the U.S. government’s approach to antitrust enforcement.

Who Works From Home?

Work From Home (WFH) opportunities were dramatically broadened during, and after, the COVID-19 pandemic, but they existed pre-pandemic. Emanuel and Harrington (and ungated here) take advantage of when WFH went to voluntary to mandatory due to the pandemic to investigate which call center workers had selected WFH. Workers switching to WFH due to office closures during the pandemic were not as productive as before but those switching to remote work pre-pandemic were even less productive. The authors infer that those choosing WFH were adversely selected. Not only did they complete fewer calls, but they had higher customer hold times and more customer call-backs indicating that call quality suffered.

Interestingly, the voluntary nature of both pre- and post-pandemic WFH choices may limit its appeal.

Our model suggests that call-center firms were trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma with a low provision of remote work before the pandemic. All call-center firms would have been better off offering remote work jobs at similar wages as on-site ones — since the costs of remote work’s negative treatment effect would be offset by savings in office real-estate costs. Yet an individual firm hesitates to offer remote and on-site jobs at similar wages, due to concerns about attracting less productive workers into remote jobs.

Finally, the reduced worker productivity could be worth it due to offsetting reduced real estate costs. However,once you factor in the adverse selection, it may no longer make economic sense.

Are heavy trucks a Nash Equilibrium?

Economist: America's love affair with big cars is killing them.

In America the average new car weighs more than 4,400lb (2,000kg) compared with 3,300lb in the European Union and 2,600lb in Japan. In 2023 vehicles weighing more than 5,000lb accounted for a whopping 31% of new cars, up from 22% five years earlier. As a London cyclist I find these numbers staggering—and scary. Our analysis shows that—aside from posing a risk to pedestrians and cyclists such as myself—the inflated weight is becoming a growing risk to the drivers of other, smaller cars. The fatality rate is roughly seven times higher when colliding with a heavy pickup truck than with a compact car.

Conservation of momentum also suggests that if you are driving a heavy pickup truck, your fatality rate is much lower. By analogy to a prisoners' dilemma, it appears that the equilibrium is to drive as heavy a vehicle as likely. 

 BOTTOM LINE: if you drive a heavy truck, I do better by driving a heavy truck, and vice-versa. In other words, we are in a Nash Equilibrium.

UPDATE: Why American Cars are so Big

Today the law mandates 40mpg. To increase efficiency, manufacturers had to use more complex engines, which made their cars costlier. To ease the burden on small businesses that relied on big vehicles, the government exempted “light trucks”, any vehicle that could be used off road and weighed less than 8,500lb (3855kg). That meant SUVs—typically among the biggest and least-efficient cars—were swept into the category and avoided the new fuel standards.

Because making light trucks held to lower environmental standards was more profitable than building small clean cars, automakers marketed big models, including SUVs, enthusiastically. They portrayed them as quintessentially American, embodying freedom, strength and adventurousness. By 2002 light trucks made up a bigger share of light-duty vehicle sales than cars.

The last refuge of a vacant liberal mind: blaming inflation on anti-competitive behavior

In the late 1970's at Stanford, I heard John Kenneth Galbraith, the economist in charge of price controls during WWII, call the idea "the last refuge of a vacant liberal mind."  The turn of phrase was so elegant and shocking--at the time, I was a liberal--that it has stayed with me.  

Here are some modern takes on this old canard.

NYT (8/16/24) "Price Gouging"

In detailing her presidential campaign’s economic agenda, Vice President Kamala Harris will highlight an argument that blames corporate price gouging for high grocery prices.

...

The Harris campaign announcement cited meat industry consolidation as a driver of excessive grocery prices, but officials did not immediately respond on Thursday to questions about the evidence Ms. Harris would cite or how her proposal would work.

 NYT (12/23):  "Greedflation"

During the debate, President Biden once again blames inflation on corporate greed. This follows an old, albeit-debunked, strategy that I first heard about as undergrad in the 1970's. Here are some modern takes on it

As rising inflation threatens his presidency, President Biden is turning to the federal government’s antitrust authorities to try to tame red-hot price increases that his administration believes are partly driven by a lack of corporate competition.

On Christmas 2021, the headline in the NY Times business section was "As Prices Rise, Biden Turns to Antitrust Enforcers."  Larry Summers immediately bashed the idea:

“The emerging claim that antitrust can combat inflation reflects ‘science denial,’ ” tweeted Harvard economist Lawrence Summers, a senior official in the Obama and Clinton administrations. “There are many areas like transitory inflation where serious economists differ. Antitrust as an anti-inflation strategy is not one of them.”

[2016]: Political compromise is like collusion, ...

... in that both harm consumers.  Steven Landsburgh's famous essay from The Armchair Economist:

Driving through northwest Washington, D.C., I remarked on the opulence that is so conspicuous in that quarter of the city. My friend Jim Kahn, in the passenger seat, wondered how such great wealth could have accumulated in a city that is notorious for producing almost nothing of value. I was too quick with the obvious cynical response: Most of it is the moral equivalent of stolen, partly through direct taxation and largely through political contributions that constitute the collection arm of a vast protection racket. 

But Jim was quicker than I and saw that according to economic theory, my explanation was not cynical enough. In the presence of competition between the parties, all of those ill-gotten gains should be used to buy votes. If the Republicans are in power, pocketing $100 billion per year, then the Democrats can offer to duplicate Republican policies exactly plus give away another billion per year to key constituents. Unchallenged, this strategy would enable them to buy the next election, pocketing a net $99 billion. But the Republicans would counter by offering to give away an extra $2 billion and settle for $98 billion for themselves. Our experience with competitive markets tells us that there is no end to this bidding war until all excessive profits are competed out of existence. 

When an industry is dominated by two highly profitable firms, theory tells us that if there is no price war then there is probably collusion. In the case of the Republicans and Democrats, the requisite collusion is on display for all to see. It is called bipartisanship. 

When Republican and Democratic legislators meet to "hammer out a compromise," they are engaging in an activity that could land any of their private-sector counterparts in jail. We do not allow the presidents of United and American Airlines to hammer out compromises regarding airfares. Why do we allow the majority and minority leaders of the Congress to hammer out compromises regarding tax policy?

Adam Smith observed that "people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices." That truth is the basis for the antitrust legislation that attempts to prevent such conspiracies and contrivances from getting off the ground. When the president of United runs into the president of American at a picnic, he is forbidden by law to say "I will not undercut you on the Chicago-to-Los Angeles route provided that you do not undercut me on New York-to-Denver." Yet we allow Republican leaders to greet Democrats with offers like, "I will support housing aid to your urban constituents if you will support agricultural programs for the farmers in my district.”

When people get rich running airlines, I can surmise that it is because they have an extraordinary talent for delivering good air service. When people get rich in the political establishment, I am reluctant to surmise that it is because they have an extraordinary talent for delivering good government. Economics provides an alternative explanation: the absence of political antitrust [enforcement].

I propose that all political compromise—indeed, all discussion between candidates, officeholders, or officials of competing parties—be fully subject to the same provisions of the Clayton and Sherman Antitrust acts that regulate the activities of every private business in America. I predict that political antitrust legislation will confer on voters the same benefits that economic antitrust legislation confers on consumers. Once the wealth of northwest Washington is depleted by the resulting political price wars, politicians might be forced to compete by offering more efficient government. 

When life imitates comedy: FTC's Amazon Flip Flop

Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase once quipped that he left antitrust because "When prices go up, its monopolization, when prices fall it's predation, and when they stay the same it's collusion." As if to illustrate this idea, the FTC's Chair is reversing herself to bring a case against Amazon.

On one hand, booksellers argue that Amazon uses its clout to obtain and sell books at lower prices, forcing them to cut their own prices [Chair Khan's former position]. On the other, the FTC says Amazon uses its market power to block other businesses from selling at lower prices [Basis of FTC's current position]. (WSJ)

When an Agency with enormous prosecutorial discretion abandons principle, it loses credibility:

The progressive antitrust movement that Khan leads is ideologically incoherent. Progressives believe that the government should break up Amazon simply because it is a big company and will say or do anything to reach their desired goal. The FTC’s and ABA’s arguments, while contradictory, both amount to the legal equivalent of flinging spaghetti at the wall and seeing what sticks. (Nat'l Rev)

There is also a rumor that the FTC might be offering VERA-VSIP (early retirement with an incentive payment), perhaps to rid themselves of the remaining staffers who still care about principle, i.e., protecting competition.  

DISCLAIMER: I have worked at the FTC and done consulting work for Amazon.

Deterrence in Merger Review: Likely Impacts of Recent U.S. Policy Changes

Luke M. Froeb Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management 

 Steven Tschantz Vanderbilt University - Department of Mathematics 

 Gregory J. Werden Independent; George Mason University - Mercatus Center 

 Date Written: January 30, 2024 

We model deterrence in a multistage merger review process, potentially ending in a court proceeding. Potential merging parties sequentially decide whether to begin the process, and whether to proceed to the next stage, in the face of uncertainty about what the enforcement agency or court will do. The model is designed to explore the complex impacts of policy changes in a costly regulatory process subject to uncertainty, and in particular to elucidate the likely impact of policy changes by the two U.S. enforcement agencies. The model shows why those policy changes can be expected to succeed in deterring bad mergers but at the cost of deterring a greater number of good mergers. 

 Keywords: mergers, deterrence, antitrust, regulation 

 JEL Classification: K22, L10, L40, L50 

Froeb, Luke M. and Tschantz, Steven T. and Werden, Gregory J., Deterrence in Merger Review: Likely Impacts of Recent U.S. Policy Changes (January 30, 2024). 

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4709897 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4709897

Nash Equilibrium Intuition from "A Beautiful Mind"

 

I could quibble but it does pretty good in under a minute.