High powered incentives
appear to have backfired for WHSmith. In its North American travel retail division, performance evaluation and
rewards were tied to aggressive profit targets. These appear to have encouraged
managers to recognize income early, particularly from supplier rebates. On
paper, the division looked like a strong performer. In reality, profits had
been pulled forward, inflating results by tens of millions of pounds. When
compensation is tightly linked to a single, measurable outcome like short-term
profit, employees rationally focus on maximizing that metric, even if doing so decreases
overall profitability.
Managers did not commit outright fraud but made possibly
defensible accounting choices. While headquarters wants sustainable
profitability, accurate reporting, and long-term relationships with suppliers,
division managers are rewarded based on short-term profitability. The result is
a predictable reallocation of profitability to where it will enhance compensation.
This is a reminder that the problem is not just bad actors, it is often good
agents responding optimally to poorly designed incentives.