If the US appeared reckless, impatient, even insane, rivals might accept bargains they would have rejected under normal conditions. ... The nuclear-armed B-52 flights near Soviet territory appeared to be a direct application of this kind of game theory. ...
On the most obvious level, the mission failed. It may have scared the Soviets, but it did not compel them to end their support for Hanoi, and the North Vietnamese certainly didn't dash to Paris to beg for peace. Nixon and Kissinger believed, though, that their threats opened the door to the arms-control deals of the early '70s. According to this argument, leaders in Moscow recognized after October 1969 that they had better negotiate with Washington, on terms amenable to American interests.
Monday, March 24, 2008
Nixon: madman or game theorist?
Recognized as perhaps our most intelligent president, Nixon tried a game of "premeditated madness" with the Soviet Union, when he sent a squadron of B-52's, armed with nuclear bombs, towards the Soviet Union.
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I remember an article about this episode at the time in The New Republic. The author -- probably John Osborne -- pointed out one weakness in the "madman" strategy: at some point, for the strategy to remain credible, you (or your principle) must actually act like a madman.
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