For 40 years the Soviet Union was indeed a growth miracle, but it was a spectacularly unsustainable one based on extractive political and economic institutions. The powerful Soviet state could generate large productivity increases by moving people from rural areas and putting them into factories.
... the reason why his thesis is ultimately unconvincing is that ... backward economies can grow rapidly and may do so using a variety of arrangements. This is made feasible because they are benefiting from catch-up and technological convergence. The fact that Soviet Russia took advantage of catch-up opportunities and transferred resources from its massively inefficient agriculture to industry implies neither that central planning was efficient in the short run nor that it could be a steppingstone for more growth-enhancing institutional structure in the long run.
Inevitably, the collectivist system collapsed due to the universal problem of management:
Do central planners have enough information to make good decisions, and the incentive to do so?
Anyone who has read chapters 1 and 2 knows the answer.