What Set-Asides Cost: A Lesson from Timber Auctions.

California's Public Utilities Commission is pressuring utilities to steer about 1.5% of procurement toward state-certified "LGBT-owned" firms.  Setting aside the certification debate, what will this cost the state? 

In every auction, the winner has to outbid the second-best bidder, so the second-best bidder sets the price. Weaken the field and you weaken that price-setter. But which way the price moves depends on whether the government is buying or selling.

When the government buys, it runs a procurement auction: bidders compete to sell to the government, and the lowest-cost bidder wins, while second-lowest-cost bidder sets the price. Restrict who can bid and the price the government pays goes up.

When the government sells, bidders compete to buy, and the highest-value bidder wins, while the second-highest-value bidder sets the price. Restrict who can bid and the price the government receives goes down.

A set-aside moves price through two separate channels, and they push the same direction. 

• First, it shrinks the number of bidders, so the second-lowest cost is higher (or the second-highest value is lower). 
• Second, the set-aside bidders themselves may be higher-cost or lower-value than the bidders they replace. 

Both channels move price against the government.  An article by a pair of middling economists shows by how much.  Prices in Forest Service small-business set-aside auctions—where only small businesses may bid—run about 15% lower than in open auctions. 

The lesson applies to California. Fewer, weaker bidders mean a worse deal for the government.