Whole Foods’ foot traffic has increased roughly 3% year over year in each of the quarters since Amazon bought the chain, ... That came after two straight years of stagnating sales at the chain before the deal.
Presumably caused by a decrease in price:
Amazon.com AMZN on Monday put itself in the unusual position of being a first-mover on price cuts when it slashed the sticker price on more than 100 items at Whole Foods Market many by more than 30%.
To calculate the implied price elasticity of demand for Whole Foods, divide the quantity increase by the price decrease:
elasticity = (%change in Q)/(%change in P)=(+3%)/(-30%) = -0.1
Demand seems very inelastic. If Amazon were trying to maximize profit on its Whole Food sales, it should have raised price, because revenue would have gone up, and quantity, and costs would have gone down. In fact, the stock price reactions seem to underscore the unprofitability of the move:
Investor concern that Amazon’s price cuts at Whole Foods will trigger a price war led to a stock selloff among traditional grocers Monday, continuing last week’s slide. Sprouts Farmers Market stock tumbled 10%, while Natural Grocers by Vitamin Cottage was down by more than 2%. Kroger, the largest U.S. grocery chain by stores and revenue, slipped 1.4% before largely recovering, while Wal-Mart Stores shares slid slightly.
What seems more plausible is that Amazon is applying its traditional pricing algorithms to the acquired Whole Foods stores.
Amazon typically relies on algorithms that scrape competitors’ prices before automatically matching or narrowly undercutting them on its website. It focuses on items that are most popular on the site and that drive traffic, according to former executives in Amazon’s retail divisions. That gives the retail giant a reputation for having the lowest prices, part of its strategy of driving more shopper traffic.