Failures ==> Learning ==> Success

Economist:

...SpaceX’s existing Falcon 9 rockets had a similar string of spectacular failures (it even released a blooper reel). But there was a method behind all the explosions. The idea is that flying lots of hardware, and failing rapidly, lets you learn from reality, which is the best teacher of all. That sort of mindset, best-known in Silicon Valley, is not how the rocket business has traditionally worked. But it is hard to argue with the results: SpaceX’s Falcon rockets have now made more than 350 successful landings. That has helped the firm cut the cost of getting a tonne of payload into space by perhaps a factor of ten. It now dominates the launch industry.

Why has US left other rich economies in the dust?

Economist:

On a per-person basis, American economic output is now about 40% higher than in western Europe and Canada, and 60% higher than in Japan—roughly twice as large as the gaps between them in 1990. Average wages in America’s poorest state, Mississippi, are higher than the averages in Britain, Canada and Germany.

WHY?

• Economies of Scale: a good idea hatched in California or product built in Michigan can, in short order, spread to 49 other states. 
• Flexible Labor Market : ...allowing people to move to better-paying jobs and drawing workers to more productive sectors. 
• Immigration: A long, porous southern border [allows] the labour force to steadily grow ... to fill the hard, dirty jobs that many native-born Americans have no interest in doing. 
• Oil & Gas:...the improvements in techniques for extracting hydrocarbons from once-unpliant shale rocks have turned America into the world’s biggest producer of oil and gas.
• Light touch Regulation:  ...has given high-tech companies room to play and grow. It also enabled the experimentation which led to the shale revolution. 
• Better regulation: After the global financial crisis of 2007-09, [regulators] clean up bank balance-sheets, and making aggressive use of monetary policy to support growth. 
• Good Macro policy: government’s willingness to step on the accelerator pedal when [the economy] has sputtered, ...[response to the] covid slowdown ... with...fiscal stimulus packages that left other countries in the dust.

What happens when you cut the supply of Northwestern football by 75%?

WSJ: Price goes up by 900%!

Ryan Field, where Northwestern played until this season, sat over 47,000 fans—nearly four times as many as the [temporary] cv lakeside stadium.

Tickets for last Saturday’s home game against Indiana started at $129 on the school’s official site, an increase of more than 900% on the $17 average secondary-market price for last season’s home opener.

The shift in capacity creates a natural experiment, a movement along the demand curve, that allows us to calculate the Price Elasticity of Demand for Northwestern football. 

(Price Elasticity of Demand) = (% change in quantity)/(% change in price) = (-75)/900 = -1/12, 

a very inelastic demand, i.e., one whose quantity does not respond much to price changes.  

But this natural experiment may make demand look less elastic than it really is because of the quality increase: its intimate feel and views of Lake Michigan, make it more attractive.  This increase (shift) in demand due to higher quality increases the price change, making demand appear less elastic than if the new stadium were the same quality as the old one.  

HT: Lamar

AI podcast on Ch1 by Notebooklm.Google (Is this better than reading text?)

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Bargaining with Longshoremen

How much bargaining power did the two sides have in the recent dock workers' strike? 

For shippers, what is the cost of a one day delay in coming to terms? The port of New York handled 6.6 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) containers in 2022, but the East cost and Gulf coast ports for which data are available handled ~21 million. The average value of a TEU is $54.500. Assume firms have a 20% annual discount rate for a little back-of-the-envelope calculation.

	Port of New York	All Affected Ports	Units
Volume Handled 2022	6.6	20.8	Million TEU
Value of TEU 2020	$54.5	$54.5	$Thousands
Annual Value	$359.7	$1,133.6	$Billion/Year
Daily Value	$985.5	$3,105.8	$Million/Day
Daily Carrying Cost	$540.0	$1,701.8	$Thousand/Day

The carrying cost alone is over $1.7 million per day, perhaps more in 2024 due to inflation and increases in trade volume. This is also a lower-bound since there will also be production disruptions & spoilage of goods. The cost to shippers might come to $3-5million per day.

What is labor's cost of a one day delay in coming to terms? The earnings of the 45,000 affected dock workers could be anywhere from $39/hour to $200,000/year. Suppose half of these would have worked on any day and that a typical day is eight hours of work, the 45,000*0.5*$39/hour*8hours = ~$7million per day. This is an upper-bound since opportunity cost of workers time is not $0. The cost to workers might be $3-5million per day.

You can adjust any of these assumptions as you deem appropriate, but it seems that the two parties were pretty evenly matched.

Colocating Complements

 

Providers of complementary services can increase demand by reducing the search costs of shared customers. Perhaps colocation will suffice but the next step would be vertical integration.

New interactive games to teach supply, demand, and pollution, a "negative externality"

From MarginalRevolution.com:

MRU videos are free for anyone’s use anytime, anywhere and don’t forget there are also two new econ-practice games on negative externalities and positive externalities and a fun choose your own adventure story on Unintended Consequences (most textbooks just teach when regulation works. We are more balanced.)

HIGHLY RECOMMENDED: These are GREAT exercises for teaching students about Demand, Supply, and shifts in Demand and Supply!

Frank Zappa on Project Selection

 

Why vertical merger challenges are hard to win

In 2016, the Antitrust Division of the US Dept of Justice (DOJ) challenged the vertical merger of Time Warner (movies) and ATT which owned DirectTV, a cable provider.  It was the first litigated vertical merger case in 40 years.

The DOJ used a "foreclosure" theory, arguing that the vertically integrated firm (movies + distribution) would give ATT the incentive and ability, via increased bargaining leverage, to raise the price of Time Warner movies to rival distributors, like Comcast. As a result, Comcast would raise its subscription price and some Comcast customer would shift from Comcast to ATT's DirectTV. 

The government argued that these anticompetitive costs outweighed the well-documented procompetitive benefits of vertical integration (Cooper et al., 2005), namely the better incentive alignment of Time Warner and ATT, e.g., that post-merger markups on TimeWarner movies shown by ATT, would fall. 

The Antitrust Division lost its case in court because they couldn't prove all the assertions of the theory, that: (i) ATT would raise the price of Time Warner content to rival distributors, (ii) Comcast would raise its subscription price, (iii) that Comcast customers would switch to ATT, and (iv) these anticompetitive costs outweighed the merger's procompetive benefits. 

After DOJ lost the case, the merger was consummated.  But ATT just sold its remaining stake in DirecTV, undoing the merger the DOJ fought so hard to challenge. 

The expert witness for the parties, Dennis Carlton et. al. (2022), weighed in on the failure of the merger:

That the previous integration did not work out as AT&T hoped represents a firm's decision regarding what risks to take in the market, not an indication that the government's alleged harms came to pass. Indeed, the disintegration is evidence that the alleged harms, such as supracompetitive pricing or other exercises of market power, did not occur. The reasoning is straightforward: if the mergers had created significant market power as the government alleged, AT&T would have been incentivized to retain ownership, which would make the subsequent spinoffs less likely (see, for example, Hazlett 2021).

ChatGPT on why Vertical merger cases are hard to win:

• Pro-competitive Justifications: Companies often argue that vertical mergers can create efficiencies, such as reducing costs, improving supply chain coordination, and enhancing product quality. These claims can be compelling in court, making it harder for the government to prove that the merger would harm competition. 
• Better incentive alignment between ATT and TimeWarner, e.g., on price, called "the elimination of double marginalization."
•  Lack of Established Precedent: There is less legal precedent and fewer clear guidelines regarding vertical mergers compared to horizontal mergers (where firms in the same market merge). Courts and regulators may have less confidence in assessing potential competitive harms in vertical mergers. 
• Market Definition Difficulties: Defining the relevant markets can be complex in vertical mergers. Regulators must consider not only the direct competitors in the market but also how the merger affects suppliers and distributors, which often involves nuanced economic analysis. 
• Is the market defined at the upstream content level or the downstream distribution level or at both?
• Indirect Effects: The potential anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers are often indirect, making it harder to demonstrate harm. For instance, a merger may not lead directly to higher prices but might reduce competition over time or create barriers for new entrants, which can be more difficult to quantify.
• Dynamic Nature of Markets: Many industries are dynamic, and the competitive landscape can change rapidly. Regulators and courts must consider not only the current state of competition but also future market developments, which adds uncertainty. 
• The advent of streaming. 
• Economic Theories: There are differing economic theories about how vertical mergers can affect competition.  Some economists argue that these mergers are typically beneficial, while others highlight potential risks. This divergence in expert opinion can complicate litigation. These factors contribute to the difficulty in successfully challenging vertical mergers in legal and regulatory contexts.
•  For example, see Boshoff et al (2021), who show that how and over what parties bargain, namely one- or two-part prices, determine whether a merger will raise price. 

REFERENCES

• Boshoff, Willem H. and Froeb, Luke M. and Minnie, Roan and Tschantz, Steven T., Bargaining Competition and Vertical Mergers (March 31, 2021). SSRN
• Dennis W. Carlton , Georgi V. Giozov, Mark A. Israel and Allan L. Shampine, 'A Retrospective Analysis of the AT&T/Time Warner Merger' (2022) 65 JLE S461
• Cooper, James, Luke Froeb, Daniel O'Brien, and Michael Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy as Problem of Inference, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23 (2005) 639–664. SSRN 
• i) Comment by John Comanor, Frederick Scherer, and Robert Steiner 
• ii) Reply by John Comanor, Frederick Scherer, and Robert Steiner 
• Cooper, James, Luke Froeb, Daniel O'Brien, and Michael Vita, A Comparative Study of United States and European Union Approaches to Vertical Policy, George Mason Law Review, 13:2 (Winter, 2005) 289-308. SSRN 
• Cooper, James, Luke Froeb, Daniel O'Brien, and Michael Vita, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy: What about the Evidence? Competition Policy International, 1:2 (Autumn, 2005) 45-64. SSRN 
• i) Comment by Frederick Scherer (2005) 
• ii) Comment by Ralph Winter (2005) 
• iii) Reply by authors (2006) 
• iv) Rejoinder by Ralph Winter (2006)
• Thomas Hazlett, “Antitrust Activists Want to Go Full Throttle. Here's a Lesson. They Should Consider First.” Barron's, July 29, 2021,.

 

Who Works From Home?

Work From Home (WFH) opportunities were dramatically broadened during, and after, the COVID-19 pandemic, but they existed pre-pandemic. Emanuel and Harrington (and ungated here) take advantage of when WFH went to voluntary to mandatory due to the pandemic to investigate which call center workers had selected WFH. Workers switching to WFH due to office closures during the pandemic were not as productive as before but those switching to remote work pre-pandemic were even less productive. The authors infer that those choosing WFH were adversely selected. Not only did they complete fewer calls, but they had higher customer hold times and more customer call-backs indicating that call quality suffered.

Interestingly, the voluntary nature of both pre- and post-pandemic WFH choices may limit its appeal.

Our model suggests that call-center firms were trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma with a low provision of remote work before the pandemic. All call-center firms would have been better off offering remote work jobs at similar wages as on-site ones — since the costs of remote work’s negative treatment effect would be offset by savings in office real-estate costs. Yet an individual firm hesitates to offer remote and on-site jobs at similar wages, due to concerns about attracting less productive workers into remote jobs.

Finally, the reduced worker productivity could be worth it due to offsetting reduced real estate costs. However,once you factor in the adverse selection, it may no longer make economic sense.