Algorithmic Pricing Paper by some middling economist

Froeb, Luke M. and Tschantz, Steven T. and Sokol, D. Daniel, Algorithmic Pricing When Capacity Turns Over: Competition, Collusion, and Information Sharing (April 29, 2026). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6675958 

BOTTOM LINE: 

First, sharing occupancy information intensifies competition, as firms compete in each realized state rather than on average. Second, as occupancy rises, it becomes more difficult to absorb diverted rival demand, so firms become worse substitutes for each other, shrinking the gains to collusion. Third, scale pools demand risk, raising occupancy and lowering prices. 

 Together, these findings identify a structural channel through which algorithmic pricing in capacity-constrained markets generates efficiency gains rather than collusive overcharges. ... The results yield practical guidance on which pricing algorithm to adopt and what information to feed it.