Tuesday, July 31, 2007
Here's a couple of reasons why you should be suspicious of my book (and also any others that claim to tell you how to succeed easily in business). First, you can't really learn anything about what causes success unless you study both successes and failures. Say I found that all of the successful companies I studied had red product logos. Well, I can't say much about any association between red logos and company success unless I know something about how many failed companies had red logos (if none of them did, perhaps I might be on to something).
Second, as Phil Rosenzweig argues in his new book, The Halo Effect, a lot of the conclusions of such a book would likely suffer from the fact that success shapes our perceptions. Let's say I interview managers from successful and unsuccessful companies about their strategic planning process. The successful managers would probably describe their clear, well-funtioning planning process as one of the factors contributing to their success while the unsuccessful managers would likely describe their muddled, problematic process as contributing to their failure. So, clear planning processes are critical to success. But, wait. Rosenzweig's point is that we would likely see this result even if the companies followed the exact same process. His book is definitely worth a read!
The final reason you should avoid my book is that no publicly available knowledge is going to help you create a competitive advantage. Let's say I correctly discover that having a CMEO (Chief Managerial Economics Officer) in your company inevitably led to competitive advantage in companies I studied. So you, the astute reader, decide to hire a CMEO for your business and no competitive advantage follows. What happened? Well, your competitor probably heard about the CMEO "secret" as well and hired one too. Now that everyone knows about it, no advantage is possible. Competitive advantage flows from having something that competitors can't easily duplicate - you're not likely to find these on the shelves of your local bookstore.
Monday, July 30, 2007
I would like to hear from our readers how business practices (relationships with suppliers and customers) differ in the absence of antitrust laws, and how they changed with the advent of laws.
 China is on the verge of passing an anti-monopoly law.
 Singapore has only recently put an antitrust law on the books.
The government presents a unique challenge to any manager because it has ... few metrics to gauge its performance, and no sticks and only small carrots to align the incentives of employees with the goals of the organization. In addition, government employees are lifetime civil servants, with better information than the political appointees who manage them and strong ideas about what the government should be doing. They can easily outlast the appointees who seem to come and go every few years or so.
Here is my bottom-line advice:
- Develop goals--without them you cede control of the policy agenda to your InBox. ...Be as specific as possible with timetables and measurable benchmarks.
- Constantly monitor progress toward your goals.
- If the organizational structure is broken, fix it. Otherwise, respect the structure you have...If you jump over your managers to get involved in specific matters, you are implictly telling them that you don't think they are capable of doing their assigned jobs.
- Finally, manage yourself. Don’t let your InBox run your life...
Friday, July 27, 2007
Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions . . . distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. . . . All fixed, fast, frozen relations . . . are swept away, all newformed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air; all that is holy is profaned . . . . KARL MARX & FREDERIC ENGELS, THE MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848).
A summary of the research is here. Don't say the government never did anything for you.
One of the surprising things to me at the FTC was the number of frauds perpetrated on poor people: credit repair, work at home scams, and diet, health, and exercise schemes. Better disclosure forms should help consumers protect themselves against deceptive lending practices.
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
- Credit scores effectively predict ... the total cost of [auto insurance] claims.
- Credit scores permit insurers to evaluate risk with greater accuracy, which may make them more willing to offer insurance to higher-risk consumers ... . [note: this is why you can call up GEICO, let them look at your credit report, and get an auto insurance quote over the phone].
- ..as a group, African-Americans and Hispanics tend to have lower scores than non-Hispanic whites and Asians.
- ...scores effectively predict risk of claims within racial and ethnic groups.
- The Commission could not develop an alternative scoring model that would continue to predict risk effectively, yet decrease the differences in scores among racial and ethnic groups.
Theory tells us that in states which ban the use of credit scores to price insurance (California and Massassachusetts) insurance companies would find it more costly to distinguish high from low risks, so they may lump them together (called "pooling"), and price insurance at the average risk. Or they may be concerned that only high risks would be willing to buy high-priced insurance (what economists call "adverse selection") and price high or, if price controls prevent high prices, exit the market.
I would be curious if any of our readers know of novel uses of credit scores as a screening mechanism, or if they have developed better predictors (point 5) in a particular application, like pricing insurance or screening job applicants.
To create economic value for the acquiring firm, the target must be acquired at a cost lower than its value. Leaving aside any issues of bargaining skill, why would we expect that a buyer would be able to purchase a target at less than its value, especially when the target firm probably has a heck of a lot better idea of its true value than the buyer does? The simple answer is that the target firm must be more valuable to the buyer than it is to the seller (the assets of the target must be moved to a higher-valued use using the language of our book). The complex part is discovering / creating that difference in value. Words like "synergy" get tossed around pretty easily, but it's a lot easier to talk about synergy than it is to actually create it.
Even though it's nearly 20 years old, the logic from this article by Jay Barney remains solid. Whether you call it creating synergistic cash flows as Barney does or moving assets to higher-valued uses as we do, it's a necessary condition for creating economic value from mergers / acquisitions. When considering or evaluating a merger, ask the hard question - why is the target more valuable to the buyer than it is to the seller? If you can't come up with a strong case, don't expect a positive result.
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
I found something similar in my experience as a government antitrust enforcer:
In some mergers the value created is obvious and well documented, but for a surprising number the analysis is nothing more than a litany of excuses copied out of a corporate strategy textbook to justify the deal to the board of directors.
For a large percentage of proposed mergers, the internal analysis of the merger by the acquiring firm was surprisingly bad:
... mergers are thought to cure a variety of corporate ailments, including, but not limited to: underdiversification, high taxes, excessive overhead, limited product offerings, under-investment in R&D, and my personal favorite, ruinous competition. All that is missing is the disclaimer that the FTC requires on testimonial ads: "results may differ.”
Apparently, however, things have gotten better. Another McKinsey survey finds that in 2006, the merger premium for the acquired firms dropped from 30% to 20% and that stock price reactions were more likely to be positive following the merger announcement.
Monday, July 23, 2007
Unless the contract grants the franchisee an "exclusive territory," the franchisor may have an incentive to set up more franchisees in the same area. Using a ten year data set of Texas Hotels, Arturs Kalnins find that when new franchisees open up nearby, incumbent franchisees lose 2-3% of their revenue. Interestingly, there is no cannibalization when a new company-owned hotel enters near an existing company-owned hotel (e.g., La Quinta and Motel 6 own most of their own hotels).
If franchisees anticipate that future franchisees will cannibalize sales, this will reduce the amount that they are willing to pay for the franchise. If franchisees do not anticipate cannibalization, they are in for a rude awakening.
Franchisees are powerful politically (easy to organize, common purpose) and often lobby state legislatures to enact franchisee "bill of rights" giving them, among other things, right of first refusal for new franchises. In states with strong franchisee bills of rights, companies with strong brands opt for company-owned stores, which are easier to control instead of the franchisee organizational form..
Friday, July 20, 2007
"Pricing: The Neglected Orphan" (available at http://www.parthenon.com/OurWork/IntellectualCapital/Documents/Parthenon-Pricing%20The%20Neglected%20Orphan_09-2004.pdf) by Roger Brinner, Partner and Chief Economist at The Parthenon Group, should be required reading for all managers and MBA students. He argues that nearly every company has the opportunity to raise effective prices. The profitability impact of price increases is dramatic. Raising price by just one percent flows directly to higher profits. He notes that with an average pre-tax profit margin of 8.6% for an S&P company, revenues would have to increase by 12% to get the same payoff.
The bottom line: don't forget the power of P.
Thursday, July 19, 2007
Ordinarily, price discrimination is profitable if firms can segment consumers by how much they are willing to pay. By offering discounts to low-value consumers, firms profit because they can increase sales to low-value consumers without cannibalizing (losing) sales to high-value ones.
However, recent research by colleagues Mike Shor and Rich Oliver showed that this intuition does not always hold . They studied the use of "promotional codes" on websites, an online analog to discount coupons. They found that the click-through rates on real websites that had boxes for promotional codes were so much lower as to render the promotional discounts unprofitable. They conclude that "Web sites prompting [high-value] customers to enter a 'promotion code,' ...may unwittingly be losing customers who otherwise would be willing to purchase."
Apparently, no one wants to be a schmuck.(1)
(1) Schmuck also shmuck: n. Slang; a clumsy or stupid person; an oaf.
Wednesday, July 18, 2007
Last week, the Supreme Court removed the blanket prohibition against retail price agreements between manufacturers and retailers. PING (the golf club manufacturer) submitted an amicus brief in the case that detailed how difficult it is to prevent discount retailers from free riding on the custom fitting services of full service retailers. The discount retailers were advising consumers to visit a full-service retailer to request a custom-fitting session, and then bring the specifications for custom-made clubs back to the discounter. PING could control this kind of opportunistic behavior only by dropping dealers, a very costly option. [For an economic analysis of resale price maintenance, see the amicii brief of 24 antitrust economists--full disclosure: I am one of the 24].
Now PING has another option, minimum resale price maintenance. The federal legality of these agreements will now be determined under a rule of reason. However, it is likely that those states more inclined towards regulation, like California and New York, will try to "repeal" the Supreme Court decision with state legislation, setting up a conflict between state and federal antitrust laws.
This just in: some manufacturers are suuing retailers who sell merchandise on eBay at a discount.